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THE GEORGE MASON
EXPERIENCE
William H. Adams, IfIt
Henry G. Manne became Dean of the George Mason University
School of Law ("GMUSL") in 1986. He retired in October 1996, af-
ter serving as Dean for ten years. During Manne's tenure, the school
was transformed from an institution that had just been accredited to
one with a national reputation for innovation and scholarly purpose.
This paper chronicles the highlights of Manne's experience at George
Mason.
For many years before Henry Manne arrived at GMUSL, he en-
visioned creating an interdisciplinary law school that would take other
academic disciplines into account in analyzing legal issues. In 1968,
Allen Wallis, who was then president of the University of Rochester,
brought Manne to Rochester as the William R. Kenan, Jr., Professor
of Law and Political Science. Manne's principal assignment was to
develop plans for a new law school. He produced an ambitious plan
for an interdisciplinary school with a curriculum that would focus
largely, but by no means exclusively, on law and economics ("L&E").
Wallis was enthusiastic about Marine's plan, but he could not imple-
ment it. The cost of the project in financial terms was high, and the
University could not obtain sufficient financing, especially in the face
of considerable opposition from both the existing faculty at the Uni-
versity and members of the Monroe County, New York, Bar.
Manne left Rochester to found at the University of Miami the
first Law & Economics Center ever to be established. After six years
at Miami, during which the Center became the subject of considerable
national attention, Manne moved with it to Emory University Law
School, where he and the Center remained until he left to become the
Dean at GMUSL.
The first incarnation of GMUSL was as the International School
of Law that was founded in the District of Columbia in 1972. For
many years, the school had been unaccredited, poorly funded, and
lacking in academic distinction. Its primary asset was its lease of the
t Of Counsel, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe LLP; Jacksonville, Florida. A.B.,
LL.B., Duke University.
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Virginia Square Shopping Center, which gave it an option to purchase
the entire center. In 1979, George Mason University acquired the
school, changed its name, and exercised its option. At the time, the
University was only thirteen years old itself, but it was already be-
coming one of the major universities in the Virginia state system.
Shortly after the University acquired the law school, the school
received provisional accreditation by the ABA. The school's new
affiliation with the University gave it a new source of financing, a
greater potential to attract faculty and students, and the possibility of
improving its reputation as an academic institution.
By 1985, the school had hired several well-qualified new faculty
members; however, the dean and most of the faculty members re-
mained as they had been when the University first acquired the
school. This made it difficult for the school to attract distinguished
faculty candidates or superior students. Although the school finally
achieved full accreditation in 1986, it continued to struggle with low
academic standards and a mediocre reputation. It seemed obvious
that without some kind of fairly dramatic change, further improve-
ment would be slow and painful-if not impossible.
Sometime in 1985, George Johnson, the University's president,
decided that increasing the stature of the law school deserved high
priority. Using funds gleaned from the sale of unimproved land sur-
rounding the law school, the University initiated this improvement
program.'
Obviously, the first step was to attract a dean with vision who
could give the school a new purpose and attract serious scholars to the
faculty. Manne was the perfect candidate for the post. He had been
one of the founders of the L&E movement; he had a national reputa-
tion as a scholar; and he had demonstrated his educational creativity.
Throughout his career, he had been a tireless promoter of economic
analysis in legal education. Since 1971, he had conducted intensive
programs providing instruction in economics to law professors and
later to federal judges. Manne had stimulated L&E scholarship by
law professors and economists through numerous seminars designed
to introduce economic analysis to law professors and legal analysis to
economists. At these seminars, L&E scholars presented papers for
The school was located in a three-story building at the comer of Fairfax and Kirkwood
Drives in Arlington, Virginia, about 18 miles from the University's main campus. The building
had once housed a department store. The law school occupied the two lower floors. Apart from
the building's excellent location on the Washington Metro Orange Line, its main distinction was
that it had escalators. When the University exercised its option to purchase, it acquired the
building and a large tract of valuable unimproved land fronting on Fairfax Drive. The Univer-
sity sold a large part of the land to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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discussion by small groups of law professors and economists.
Manne's activities in promoting L&E had a significant impact on se-
rious legal scholarship. They had also given him a large following
among law professors and judges who had participated in his pro-
grams.
Henry Manne also had experience as an administrator, a record
as a successful fundraiser, and, most importantly, a unique albeit
controversial vision of the kind of curriculum a modem law school
should offer. Manne was exactly the kind of person Johnson was
looking for. He could attract highly qualified faculty members and
improve the school's reputation as an academic institution. Moreo-
ver, his promotional ability together with his innovative but contro-
versial approach to legal education would ensure that changes he
made in the school would receive widespread publicity.
The agenda Manne presented to Johnson for GMUSL was not
quite as ambitious as his plan for Rochester. It called for an interdis-
ciplinary law school that would emphasize legal theory and focus on
L&E. However, unlike most law schools that, largely due to Manne's
previous educational efforts, had recently instituted courses in L&E,
GMUSL would not offer a separate L&E course. Instead, the entire
curriculum would be informed by economic analysis.
As anyone could have expected, the plan was controversial.
Many traditional lawyers, including many members of the then-
existing faculty, could not see how knowledge of economics could
help students become lawyers. Others opposed the increased empha-
sis on abstract theory of any kind, believing that law students needed
a more practical curriculum. Existing faculty members who knew
little about L&E could justifiably feel threatened and defensive.
Many liberal observers considered that an economic approach to
analyzing legal issues was little more than right-wing indoctrination.
An ordinary person could not have successfully promoted the
plan Manne offered. In most institutions, an ordinary candidate with
Manne's ideas could not have survived the selection process, and
even if he were selected, he would have failed in his first year as a
dean. Three factors enabled Manne to achieve a degree of success
that an ordinary person could not have hoped for. The first factor was
that James M. Buchanan, a member of the George Mason University
faculty, had received the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics. The re-
sulting publicity probably motivated University President George
Johnson to build further on the University's reputation for economic
scholarship. The second major factor was President Johnson's vigor-
ous support. The final factor was Marine's own attitude and determi-
nation to implement his vision of what a law school should be.
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Traditional university and law school governance practices tend
to frustrate initiative and originality, but Johnson was an educational
autocrat. He liked Manne's plan and made it clear that he would
brook no administrative interference from faculty members. Johnson
is said to have told the University Provost that even if Manne did not
come to George Mason, he would see to it that Manne's plan for the
law school was implemented.
Fortunately, Johnson did not have to follow through on his re-
solve to implement the Manne Plan without Manne. The strength of
Johnson's support withered the opposition, and after a perfunctory
faculty process, Manne was offered the deanship.
Although bureaucratic barriers make it difficult to hire a new
dean bent on dramatic change, the hiring process is only the first step.
Once a dean is in office, he must overcome even greater obstacles.
Tenure, university rules, and the tradition of faculty self-governance
effectively block most attempts to achieve major educational reforms.
Johnson's continued support during the next few years helped Manne
navigate through the obstacles and make GMUSL one of the fairly
rare educational institutions that has actually changed direction in a
significant and positive way.
Manne's idea of leadership was the same as Johnson's. He made
it clear from the beginning that he would not accept the deanship un-
less he was given a substantially free hand in making the major
changes he believed were needed. Johnson strongly backed him in
this, committing to the law school money that Manne needed to up-
grade the faculty. A majority of the faculty also acquiesced in the
conditions that Manne imposed.
What ensued was a remarkable transformation of the faculty.
Manne announced that, with few exceptions, non-tenured faculty
contracts would not be renewed the next year. Then he embarked
upon the task of convincing some members of the tenured faculty that
their lives would be more rewarding at other institutions. By refusing
to renew contracts of non-tenured faculty members and buying out
contracts of a few members of the tenured faculty, Manne eventually
opened fourteen faculty positions. He set about to fill those positions
by persuading distinguished L&E scholars to join him in creating a
new law school that would provide an unabashedly theoretical educa-
tion grounded on L&E.
Manne was selected too late to make faculty changes before the
1986 academic year began. Only two new members, Henry N. Butler
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and William E. Kovacic, joined the faculty at the beginning of the
1986-87 academic year.2
During 1986-1987, Manne hired at least six new full-time faculty
members to begin the following year: William Bishop,3 Steven M.
Crafton,4 Steven J. Eagle,5 Michael I. Krauss,6 Timothy J. Muris,7 and
Larry E. Ribstein.8 Each of the new hires had both an L&E orienta-
tion and a substantial reputation for legal scholarship in his field.
Manne made the hiring decisions with only minimal faculty involve-
ment. Manne also brought on board as distinguished part-time faculty
members former United States Circuit Judge Robert Bork and United
States Circuit Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg.
Attracting these scholars to GMUSL was a remarkable achieve-
ment. The law school had been fully accredited for only about a year.
Faculty members at other schools who considered moving to GMUSL
risked significant damage to their future careers. They would be
leaving secure positions at established schools to join the faculty of a
school with a poor reputation that they could only hope would be-
come nationally recognized for positive achievements. If it did not
become recognized, they could be stigmatized. Those willing to take
the risk did so because they knew Henry, admired his scholarship,
shared his vision, and had confidence in his ability to create a new
kind of law school that would eventually be recognized for its aca-
demic excellence.
Manne strongly encouraged the members of the tenured faculty
whom he did not ask to leave to learn something about L&E. Many
attended Manne's summer L&E Program for Law Professors. Those
2 Butler, who had a Ph.D. in Economics, was an Olin Fellow under Manne at the Univer-
sity of Miami Law School. Even though Marine had not yet assumed the Deanship when Butler
was appointed, he had been able to influence Butler's appointment. Kovacic came to the law
school from the Washington office of a national law firm. Previously, he had been an attorney
in the Planning Office of the FTC's Bureau of Competition and a legal assistant to a member of
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
3 A British L&E scholar.
4 Crafton had a Ph.D. in Economics, had been an Olin Fellow under Manne at Emory
University Law School, and was in the litigation department of a national lav firm for the pre-
vious three years.
5 Eagle moved to George Mason from the University of Toledo Law School where he
had been a tenured professor and an Associate Dean.
6 Krauss, a Yale educated L&E scholar, came to George Mason from the University of
Sherbrooke.
7 After leaving a professorship at the University of Miami Law School, where he wrote
extensively on the Federal Trade Commission, Muris had been a director of both the Bureau of
Consumer Protection and the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission. He
came to George Mason after serving for three years as Executive Associate Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, in the Executive Office of the President of the United States.
8 Ribstein, a prolific author of works on business organization and securities, had been a
professor of law at Mercer University from 1981-1985.
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who did not were assigned to teach courses in which economic analy-
sis had little relevance.
Two tenured faculty members accepted offers to go on half-time
teaching for two years during which they would use their remaining
time to pursue Ph.D.'s in economics at.the law school's expense.
In order to ensure that students would be exposed to L&E from
their first days in law school, one of the new faculty members was
assigned to teach each of the traditional first year courses. It was also
understood that new members would work toward establishing a col-
legial environment in which remaining members of the old faculty
could be exposed to economic analysis and its application in analyz-
ing legal issues.
One of Manne's first acts was to establish a weekly workshop
series at which L&E scholars from GMUSL and other law schools
would present papers for faculty discussion. This program continued
through all of Manne's tenure as Dean, and it still continues today.
One of the central features of Manne's plan for the law school
was an emphasis on specialization. Manne envisioned a series of
specialty "tracks," which would represent the first systematic cur-
riculum giving law school students an opportunity to specialize dur-
ing their three years before graduation in some broad field which re-
quired an understanding- of economic analysis.
Under the track system, first year law students would be given
the choice, upon their matriculation, of pursuing their studies through
either a traditional law school curriculum or a specialty track cur-
riculum. Students who chose a specialty track would take an inten-
sive series of courses in which, with the exception of only one or two
electives, courses for all three school years would be prescribed in
advance. The number of hours required for graduation from a track
would be significantly greater than the number usually required for
graduation.
Students who elected a track would take a series of courses in
different aspects of the field that was the subject of the track. The
first course would begin in the student's first semester of law school,
and later courses would be designed to build on the information cov-
ered in earlier courses. In this way, students would study issues in the
subjects covered by the tracks in considerably more depth than is
normally the case in law school courses. In their third year, track stu-
dents would be required to write a lengthy thesis.
During the 1987-1988 academic year, Manne appointed a cur-
riculum committee chaired by Henry Butler. The new faculty mem-
bers constituted a majority of the committee. The committee ap-
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proved the track system, identified the broad subjects of the first
tracks as Patent Law, Corporate and Securities, and Banking, and cre-
ated a general outline of the courses students in each track would be
required to take. After the required courses, there was little time left
for track students to take elective courses.
In discussing with Manne courses that would make up the cur-
riculum, it became immediately apparent that track students would
need to have an understanding of economics, finance, and accounting.
A course covering these subjects in the first year would give students
the basic understanding they would need and enable faculty members
teaching track courses to assume that their students had that under-
standing. For example, those who taught corporate law could assume
that students knew the basics of portfolio theory.
Because the entire curriculum would focus on L&E, the cur-
riculum committee, with Manne's strong support, decided to require
all first year students to take a course in what was to be called Quan-
titative Methods. The quantitative methods course would be designed
to give students formal instruction in microeconomics, probability
and statistics, finance, and accounting. Steven Crafton accepted re-
sponsibility for developing the course, which he first offered in 1989.
By 1991, he had written a casebook in which the quantitative subject
matter of the course was presented in the context of decided cases.
Crafton's casebook demonstrated not only the relevance of L&E to
judicial decision-making in a variety of different fields, but also how
poorly judges and lawyers sometimes handled these fundamental is-
sues.
9
The track program was formally instituted in 1989. Irving Kay-
ton, who had taught courses in Patent and Intellectual Property at the
George Washington University Law School since 1964, moved to
GMUSL and created the first track. Larry Ribstein created a Corpo-
rate and Securities Track, and I was brought in to coordinate the
Banking Track. In later years, tracks were instituted in Real Estate,
International Trade, Litigation, and Regulation.
The changes Manne made in his first few years received consid-
erable publicity in the academic world, and the reputation of the law
school demonstratively improved. In 1989, the U.S. News & World
Report survey of law schools listed GMUSL in the second tier of law
9 I audited this course and can testify to its excellence. The course gave students much
more than knowledge of quantitative methods. The instructional materials that Crafton, a for-
mer litigator, selected required students to read cases carefully and critically, to understand the
procedural posture in which quantitative issues arose, and to use their knowledge of economics,
portfolio theory, or accounting to assess how the parties and the courts had handled those issues
in actual litigated cases.
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schools and as one of the three "up and coming" law schools in the
country. 0
Manne's innovations did not end with the creation of the track
program. He recognized that law students throughout the country
were graduating without writing skills, and he was determined to do
something to improve the writing of all George Mason graduates,
whether or not they had elected a track. He ordered faculty members
in all small classes after the first year to require students to submit a
paper, and he instituted a policy of giving students two grades in each
course--one grade would measure the student's grasp of the subject
and the other his writing.
Unfortunately, before Manne could fully implement his plan for
the school, state revenues declined dramatically. The decline forced
the state to reduce expenditures for higher education. The Governor
ordered a ten-percent across-the-board cut in the funds allotted to
universities. Older state universities that had built a degree of fat into
their budgets were better able to accept the cut than George Mason. It
was new and was already operating at a bare-bones level. Anticipat-
ing that funds would be available later to build the school's infra-
structure, the University had spent most of its funds to hire the new
faculty that was critical to its overall improvement. For the law
school, particularly, a ten-percent cut was debilitating. It made it im-
possible to hire needed additions to the faculty, to have more than two
or three faculty secretaries, to buy new books for the library, and to
make other basic expenditures that were essential to its operation.
The cut had a serious negative impact on faculty morale.
Manne pressed the University administration for a greater allo-
cation of funds, but the administration was not nearly as forthcoming
as he or the faculty thought it should be. At about this time, Univer-
sity President Johnson began to withdraw his support of Manne and
the law school. Why he did this is unclear. Perhaps Manne's contin-
ued demands for more funds began to wear thin with an administra-
tion that was faced with similar claims from every division of the in-
stitution. Because the law school was located some fifteen miles
from the president's office, perhaps it was easier for the president to
ignore the dean of the law school than the division heads who were
closer at hand. Another possible reason was that, although the law
school taught law with a focus on L&E, it was still a law school, the
goal of which was to produce lawyers. Johnson had a well-known
10 See Ted Gest, Best Professional Schools: Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 19,
1990, at 59-60.
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antipathy to lawyers, whom he tended to lump together as group. In
fact, he seems to have viewed educating lawyers as somewhat akin to
breeding rats. Whatever the reason, the law school's funding never
reached the level that Manne was led to expect when he came to
George Mason, and Manne's relationship with the administration be-
came seriously strained.
The George Mason Law Review was not a distinguished publi-
cation. Manne decided that something should be done about it. But,
like many law reviews, it was published by a student organization and
funded by student fees. It operated quite independently of faculty
supervision. Student control meant that students with little more than
two years experience in addressing legal issues were selecting and
editing articles submitted for publication by far more experienced
lawyers, including sometimes judges and distinguished faculty mem-
bers from other law schools. Student control of law reviews often
leads to a poor choice of articles and an editing experience that many
legal writers are unwilling to endure.
Law reviews are one of the few kinds of academic publications
that are run by students. In other disciplines, publications are con-
trolled and edited by faculty members. A few of the more sophisti-
cated law reviews are also under faculty control.'
2
Having long been critical of student-controlled law reviews,
Manne concluded that the George Mason Law Review could not be
significantly improved unless it could be converted from a student-
run publication to one controlled by the faculty. Unfortunately, he
announced this change as he was leaving for a four-month sabbatical
in Italy.
When the students learned that Manne had decided to bring the
law review under faculty control, they erupted angrily. Membership
on a student-run law review is both an honor for the student and a
credential that many prospective employers consider critical. Mem-
bers of the law review had worked diligently to achieve their mem-
bership, and the threat of having the significance of that achievement
diluted struck deep. They strenuously objected to Manne's decision.
Even students who had nothing to do with the Law Review considered
the change an unwarranted interference in student affairs and a taking
1 Shortly after Manne arrived at George Mason, Judge Frank Easterbrook, most of whose
previous articles had been published in the most distinguished law reviews, desiring to help
GMUSL, submitted an article to the George Mason Lav Review. A student editor made sub-
stantial changes in the article. Judge Easterbrook was furious and came close to withdrawing
his submission.
12 Examples are the Journal of Lmv and Economics, the Journal of Legal Studies, and
Law & Contemporary Problems.
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of students' property rights. Many of them joined in the protest,
which escalated to a point where it was covered by the outside media
and went as far within the University as a petition to the President,
who supported Manne's decision.
When the students insisted on continuing to publish the student
law review, Manne created another law review edited by a member of
the faculty with the assistance of some of the students who had sided
with Manne's decision. But the unseemly picture of two competing
law reviews coupled with the strength and bitterness of student resis-
tance eventually forced Manne to give up the effort. The law review
controversy went away, but it had a serious long-term negative impact
on student and faculty morale.
Manne's plan for the George Mason Law Review had been a
good one, and he might have succeeded in implementing it if he made
a more determined effort to lay the groundwork for the change and if
he had been more willing to negotiate either a transition or a solution
that had more student support. Perhaps he could have convinced the
students of the long-term benefit to them and the school that could
come from making the improvements he suggested. But there was no
way he could have solved the problem by long distance telephone.
Manne implemented other new programs for the law school.
One was the Supreme Court Economic Review.13 Another was the
Robert Levy Fellowship Program which was modeled after the highly
successful Olin Fellowships that had made it possible for Manne to
attract outstanding students to his programs when he taught at Miami
and Emory. Robert Levy, who funded the fellowships, was a 1994
graduate of GMUSL. Before coming to the law school, he had been a
successful entrepreneur. He was attracted to the school by its unique
L&E curriculum.
14
Despite Manne's enormous achievements, his relationship dete-
riorated, not only with the administration, but also with the law school
faculty. The causes were no doubt complex, and no one can be sure
of all of the factors that contributed to the deterioration. My own
view is that the reasons Manne's relationship with the University ad-
ministration deteriorated were different from the reason for his prob-
lems with the faculty.
As I have noted, Manne may have alienated the administration
by his demands for funds. He believed that the law school was the
13 Manne started the Supreme Court Law Review when he was at Emory. It was not pub-
lished for several years. It was revived at GMUSL.
14 After graduating from GMUSL, Levy served as a law clerk for United States Circuit
Judge Douglas Ginsburg. He is now a policy analyst at the Cato Institute.
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only educational division of George Mason University that had made
major improvements and was achieving national recognition for the
University. It followed logically that the only sensible decision the
administration could make was to provide the funding that Manne
expected so that GMUSL could continue to improve. If money was
short, it would be better to reduce the budgets of some of the Univer-
sity's less successful divisions. 15
But Manne's demands put the law school in direct competition
with other University divisions. The heads of those divisions were on
the same campus with the President, saw him frequently, and proba-
bly had a closer relationship with him than Manne did. They were
aided by the perception in the other divisions that Manne's emphasis
on L&E had made the law school a right-wing bastion. In almost any
university community, such a perception can have a deadly effect.
That perception of the law school probably increased President John-
son's problems with legislative leaders in negotiating for funding for
the University and defending the law school against demands by
competing units that the law school's funding be further reduced. All
this, of course, is supposition. It is not supposition to say that, for
whatever reason, Manne lost favor with the administration and never
received the funding he was striving to get for the law school.
The school's continued funding deficiencies, in turn, caused a
gradual drop in the high levels of morale and enthusiasm that had
characterized the faculty in the early days of Manne's administration.
The strength and determination that had made Manne's success
possible also caused resentment that grew until his relations with the
faculty ultimately broke down. Manne's autocratic approach to
making decisions within the law school did not help promote the mo-
rale of either faculty or the students. Manne's superb intellect, his
abiding confidence in his own decisions, and his determination to
overcome any obstacles in implementing them gave him a formidable
potential. When he fully understood the facts, he could make unex-
ceptionable decisions. But sometimes he was not aware of critical
facts that he needed to take into account in his decision-making. He
could have learned them if he had consulted faculty members and
students who would be required to implement the decisions. But on
many occasions he sought little or no input before he acted, and once
he acted, he seldom looked back.
IS The law school was generating a positive cash flow for the University and thus was
helping to finance other departments. In a sense, Manne only wanted more of the funds the law
school was providing.
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More importantly, his attitude toward members of the faculty
who disagreed with him or whose actions did not meet his approval
led an increasing number of them to believe that he did not respect
them or their opinions. 6 In reaction, they gradually volunteered less
information.
As relations became strained, Manne gave his two associate
deans increasing responsibility for dealing with the faculty, and his
direct communication with individual faculty members declined even
more. Although faculty members dealt with the associate deans, they
believed that Manne made most decisions and that their views were
not considered.
Manne did not seem to recognize that agency costs can be cre-
ated by low morale as well as by more traditional economic factors
and that if the school were to continue its upward progress, his role as
Dean required him to communicate with the faculty, be willing listen
to their concerns, and encourage their suggestions. His failure to do
this well led to a growing resentment among many faculty members
who had come to GMUSL because they wanted to work with him.
The accumulated resentment was no doubt a major factor that com-
bined with the school's financial problems in leading to Manne's
resignation.
Before coming to George Mason, Henry Manne had had a long
record of success in raising funds. When he moved to GMUSL, the
demands of his role as dean restricted the time he could devote to
fund raising. He appointed a succession of directors for the Center
and turned over primary fund-raising responsibility to them. But
Manne continued to be involved and to make some efforts to raise
funds for the Center.
The profit from Center programs helped to provide summer re-
search grants to members of the faculty. Faculty members had great
confidence in Manne's ability to raise funds for the law school, and
they believed that with sufficient effort he could raise the funds the
school needed. Their expectations were probably unrealistically
high,17 and when the profit from the Center's programs decreased and
16 Most faculty members were grateful that Manne was willing to make administrative
decisions without involving them in the endless committee work that is found on most faculties.
Their primary complaint was that he often acted without the benefit of knowledge that would
have improved the quality of his decisions.
17 It is difficult to raise funds for any law school. Most contributions to a law school are
made by graduates of that law school. Some of the contributions come from practicing lawyers,
but the largest come from graduates who have created successful businesses. GMUSL was a
new law school with few alumni able to make contributions. Moreover, Manne had never raised
funds for a law school. His fundraising success came in the form of contributions from founda-
tions and businesses who were willing to fund the programs he had created that provided eco-
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funds for summer faculty grants had to be cut, Manne got the blame.
The personal loss of expected research funds coupled with the re-
sentment that members of the faculty had accumulated over several
years sparked the faculty revolt that ultimately led to Manne's resig-
nation.
In spite of the unfortunate ending of Manne's George Mason
experience, his accomplishments at GMUSL were truly enormous. In
a few years, he transformed a barely-accredited, struggling law school
into a nationally-known and highly respected educational institution
whose faculty members published in the most highly regarded law
reviews and whose better graduates were sought as judicial clerks and
associates in major law firms. 18 Although GMUSL's rating in U.S.
News & World Report was recently downgraded to the third tier," the
core faculty that Manne brought together is still in place and, with
good leadership, the school still has the potential to continue the up-
ward progress that Manne began.
In social settings, no one could be more gracious than Manne.
But his working personality was like that of many dedicated and
creative people who, through their single-minded vision, strength of
will, and inflexibility create new enterprises which they are ultimately
forced to leave. These unforgiving personal qualities contribute
mightily to their creative success, but the same qualities often prevent
them from developing organizations in which the actors function to-
gether effectively as a team. If Manne had been a more flexible per-
son, he might not have transformed GMUSL as he did, and there
would have been no significant creation for him to leave.
Although Manne is no longer associated with GMUSL, the
school and its faculty should be forever in debt to him for the solid
foundation he has left for them to build on.
nomic education to law professors and judges. The law school could benefit from these pro-
grams only to the extent they were profitable. As the programs became more expensive, the
profit available for use by the law school was reduced.
18 George Mason was recently ranked within the law schools whose graduates are most
frequently employed by the 100 largest law firms in the country.
'" See 2000 Graduate Rankings, Top Law Schools - U.S. News and world Report,
<http:llusnews.com/usnes/edu/beyond/gradrankllaw/gdlawsl.htm>.
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